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Abstract  
The thesis provides an empirical analysis of impact of country-level and firm-level 
determinants on access to finance in transition economies. Generalized Ordered Logit 
model is applied on survey data for transition countries, combined with financial 
market indicators. The results show that higher concentration in banking sector, as 
well as higher financial deepening have a positive impact on access to finance, while 
volatile macroeconomic environment, higher implication of foreign-owned and state-
owned banks seems to be perceived as increasing obstacles in accessing external 
financing. Combining indexes for liberalization in banking sector and liberalization 
of securities markets proved that before liberalization process firms had better access 
to finance. One of the possible explanations is that before liberalization state banks 
were forced by politicians to issue more loans, while after reforms the political 
pressure was removed, imposing stricter conditions for loan granting. Inclusion of 
corruption variable yields expectable results that higher corruption level is associated 
with worse access to finance. The results for firm-level variables indicate that larger 
firms and firms from service sector benefits from better access to finance. Also, 
companies that apply for an external audit face fewer obstacles in accessing finance, 
than those that do not. Inclusion of control variable for crisis period increases the 
consistency and robustness of results. 
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Finance is one of the motors that keep the machinery of economics running 
and producing more and more output. The importance of finance cannot be 
undervalued, since the lack of it generally leads to shortage in other production 
recourses. The linkage between finance and economic growth had been analyzed in 
number of studies (King & Levine(1993),  Gregorio & Guidotti(1995), Aterido, 
Hallward-Driemeier, & Pages(2007) and others). Better access to finance implies 
better production resources allocation, which translates into faster economic growth. 
Therefore, understanding of influence of different factors on access to finance is 
important for policy making that aims to foster economic growth. While it is quite 
evident that a better access to finance has a positive impact on the evolution of the 
economy, there is no general opinion on the effect of the determinants of access to 
finance (for example Clarke, Cull, & Pería (2006) versus Detragiache, Gupta, & 
Tressel (2006) regarding the impact of presence of foreign-owned banks, or Brown, 
Jappelli, & Pagano (2009) versus Hainz & Nabokin (2009) regarding the effect of 
information sharing). The fact that same factors are regarded as positive and negative 
in different studies, leads to conclusion that the respective field of research is not yet 
saturated, and the results of analysis of access to finance can still be improved and 
extended. 
The main purpose of the current thesis is to focus on the determinants of 
access to finance in transition economies. Since such economies did not follow a 
“natural” path of formation of free market economies, they are characterized with 
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strong specifics and particularities, which require that these countries to be studied 
separately from developed economies in order to achieve consistent results. Also, 
another objective of the current study is to combine both country-level and firm-level 
determinants of access to finance in an integral analysis that would assure a more 
complete vision on the question of access to finance. Particularly, the study is 
orientated towards determinants that are subject to policy making in transition 
economies, such as CPI evolution or participation of foreign-owned banks, but also 
includes control variables that increase consistency of results, such as corruption 
level, firm size or dummy for companies that apply for external audit services. The 
proposed econometric model is Generalized Ordered Logit, as it proved to be 
efficient in estimations where the dependent variable is contracted as ordinal variable 
that can take several ranged values. 
This thesis is  structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the existing studies on the matter of access to finance. The chapter 
contains review of works that study the importance of access to finance on both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic level. It also includes a discussion on the impact 
of different country-level and firm-level factors that are perceived as increasing or 
decreasing obstacles in accessing external financing; Chapter 3 presents the overview 
situation on the financial markets in transition economies. Also, it reflects the 
methodological framework that will be applied in during empirical analysis, the main 
hypothesis of the present thesis, as well as provides description of the dependent and 
explanatory variables and the intuition behind them; Chapter 4 contains the empirical 
results obtained by application of methodology presented in the chapter 3, possible 
flows and solutions of  outlined methodology, and final results based on improved 
approach and their interpretations; Chapter 5 summaries the findings of the thesis and 
resents the concluding remarks. The references list and the annexes that contain 
information on country-level indicators used in the analysis and detailed empirical 
results can be found at the end of the present thesis.   
 
  










2.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter contains an overview of recent studies on the question of access 
to finance: its impact for the economic development, and the factors that have a 
significant influence on it. First section makes references to works that provide 
evidence on how exactly the access to finances is related to macroeconomic and 
microeconomic environment. It outlines the importance of understanding of role and 
mechanism of change of access to finance. 
Second and third section presents the existing studies on the influence of 
specific determinants, external and internal for firms, on the way the access to finance 
is perceived by the enterprises. The conclusions from the cited studies are not 
unambiguous, the same factors being regarded as having positive impact in one 
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2.2 The importance of access to finance 
The question of access to finance is widely studied in the literature, but 
mostly, from the angle of two aspects: what are the determinants of access to finance, 
and how access to finance influences firms‟ choices and activities. On the 
microeconomic level, access to finance represents an important growth constrain, 
especially to SME (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), and on the macroeconomic level, 
a better financial intermediation translates to a better resource allocation, and leads to 
acceleration in total factor productivity growth, with positive impact on the long-term 
economic growth (Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000). 
Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, & Pages(2007) state that improved access to 
capital markets seems to benefit more to the growth of non exporters firms compared 
to the growth of companies that supply to the international market. The results of the 
analysis of dataset for 102 developing and 5 high-income countries (provided by 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys) show that low access to finance, as well ashigh 
corruption, poorly developed business regulations have negative impact on the 
distribution of employment(Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, & Pages, 2007).According 
to Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Panos(2009), wealthier households with a better 
access to bank financing are more likely to becomeentrepreneurs and survive the 
early period of adjustment. Beck, Kunt, & Maksimovic(2002) find that firms that face 
higher obstacles in obtaining finance grow slowly, which denotes the importance of 
the development of country financial systems. Schmukler(2007) also states that low 
level of access to finance, especially through bank credit, prevents lower-income 
households, as well as small firms from financing high profitability investment 
projects, which has an unfavorable effect long-term growth and poverty mitigation. 
King & Levine(1993) perform an analysis of data for 80 countries for 1960-
1989 period to study the relationship between finance and economic growth. The 
findings show that financing conditions influence the activity of firms that translates 
into productivity increase in four ways. First, financial systems analyze the 
enterprises and stimulate the most promising ones. Second, financial systems permit 
risk diversification, which is very important in the investment activities. Third, 
financial systems contribute to allocation of resources to more efficient projects. And 
forth, financial systems reveal the potential gains for entering innovational projects, 
instead of sustaining only the existing project, which apply only existing techniques. 
Thus, better financial systems contribute to a faster economic growth by accelerating 
the rate of productivity increase and growth of per capita output (King & Levine, 
1993). This conclusion is in line with the findings by Gregorio & Guidotti(1995) that 
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show that the main channel of transmission from financial development to economic 
growth lays in the effect of efficient allocation of in investment, rather than merely its 
volumes of investment. Ndikumana(2005) studies the data for 99 developing and 
developed countries for period between 1965 and 1997, and concludes that the 
structure of the financial system has no independent impact on the investment, 
therefore it is the financial development that makes the investmentmore sensitive to 
output increase. 
Thus, the importance of financial systems, and hence, the access to finance 
cannot be underestimated, since it has an important impact both on the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic level. Further literature overview focuses on the 
studies that analyze the factors that determine the level of access to finance. 
Therefore, policies targeting financial systems and access to finance may have an 
important effect on the rates of long-term economic growth. 
 
 
2.3 External determinants of access to finance 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2004) study the effect of the structure 
of the banking sector on the on the access to bank loan, for individual firms. The 
authors use 74 country–level indicators for developed and developing countries, and 
firm–level data composed of survey of over 100.000 companies in 80 countries also 
both developed and developing (the data is provided by World Business Environment 
Survey, conducted in 1999-2000). The ordered probit model is applied to test for 
impact of banking sector structure. Control variables included in the model are: 
inflation rate, GDP per capita growth, and dummies for state or foreign control of a 
firm, whether the company is exporting or not, dummy for type of firm‟s domain of 
activity (manufacturing or services) and number of competitors. Also, a dummy for 
firm size was included in the analysis, in order to separate the effect of the structure 
of banking sector on companies of small, medium and large size (the variable is 
constructed based on number of employees).   
The estimations by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2004) show that in 
banking systems with higher concentration, firms face higher obstacles in obtaining 
loan finance. The effect is strong for small and medium sized companies, compared 
to large sized ones. Also, including GDP and an interaction term with bank 
concentration per capita shows that results are significant only for low-income 
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countries. Thus, the authors emphasize that controlling for economic development of 
a county, and it‟s level of institutional and environmental development is important 
for analyzing the impact of competitiveness on the banking sector, on the access to 
finance for individual firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004). 
Peachey and Rey (2004) also confirm the influence of bank consolidation, 
quoting their previous work:  in countries with wider bank competition, the rate of 
growth for SME is faster. They bring the example of Poland, were SME segment 
experienced a growth from 30% share of GDP in 1995 to 55% in 2009, with banks 
now providing more 50% of the corporate financing to SME, and attracting around 
50% of deposits also from this segment. 
Also Peachey and Rey (2004) study access to finance on data for 163 
countries, covering 95% of world population. The data is provided by IMF 
International Financial Statistics, and merged with indicators like GDP, price data 
and population, from World Bank Development Indicators. The authors examine the 
balance of cash in circulation and deposits mobilized, in order to divide countries into 
a spectrum containing categories from countries with very repressed access to finance 
to intermediate stages of widening access, and to countries with full access to finance, 
typically characteristic for developed economies. The analysis shows that in order 
moving from the first stage, with the worse conditions of access to finance, requires a 
10 to 20% of deposit to GDP ratio, depending on the cash to deposits ratio. Countries 
with cash to deposit ratios over 30% are qualified as having “repressed” access to 
finance. Contrary, countries, which can be graded as in transition to full access, can 
be described by 20–40% range of deposits to GDP ratio, and cash to deposits ratio 
below 20%.  
The paper (Peachey & Rey, 2004) also contains an estimate of number of 
bank accounts per capita within the zoning described above. The obtained magnitude 
is 0.1 account or less per capita for “repressed” access, 0.2–0.5 account per capita 
for intermediate stage, and above 0.5 accounts per capita for moving towards full 
access economies. The impact of other economic variables, as participation of the 
labor force, poverty-rates and GDP per capita, along with some social indicators (as 
balance between young and old, adult literacy and young to adults ratio) is also 
assessed.  
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Figure 2.1 depicts the relationship between cash to deposit ratio and total 
household and enterprise deposits‟ share in GDP. Countries with advanced industrial 
economies are depicted in white circles; light-grey circles represent major offshore 
centers; and dark grey – all other countries.  
Figure 2.1: Use of cash versus deposit 
Source: Peachey & Rey (2004). 
The study also shows the division by regions in terms of access to finance: 
Sub-Saharan Africa is strongly positioned in worse access to finance category (which 
mainly reflects the level of poverty in the aria); industrially developing countries 
from Asia, and Asia as a whole are pretty advanced in finance access; although most 
advanced transition economies of Central Europe succeeded in widening the access to 
finance after the decline of 1990s, the CIS countries are still outsiders in this process; 
Central and South America results show that this regions made less progress than 
expected, in spite of strong economical potential, which is particularly true for the 
larger economies of the aria (Peachey & Rey, 2004). 
In conclusions to the analysis, the authors disagree with the statement that the 
fact that in poor countries the banking sector is mostly small relative to GDP 
determines higher costs for the banking systems, thus financing being accessible only 
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to privileged elite (Peachey & Rey, 2004). Thus, new policies in recycling deposits in 
form of credits should be applied, that would stimulate efficiency in the use of cash 
by the economy. In order to expand the deposits to GDP ratio and to widen access to 
finance, it is necessary to reduce the extent to which an economy relies on cash.  
Cetrorelli (2003) conducted an analysis the effect of bank concentration and 
bank deregulation on the structure of industry sectors of European markets. Fixed-
effects model was applied on the data for 29 OECD countries, extracted from the data 
set provided by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The 
model for the effect of bank concentration had the following specification: firm size 
as dependent variable and country-specific, industry specific and time-specific 
components of firm size as control variables. In order to control for the dependence 
on external source of finance, which also depends on firm age, bank concentration 
variable is multiplied by an indicator variable for dependence on external financing, 
which is equal to one for mature firms (above ten years old) with dependence on 
external finance higher than medial level. The results show that bank concentration 
exhibits positive and significant impact on firm size (controlling county, industry and 
time for fixed effects), which indicates that, in countries with higher bank 
concentration, sectors were old firms are more dependent on external financing, are 
characterized with firms of disproportionally larger size (Cetrorelli, 2003). Also, 
taking in consideration that membership of EU may lead to more vigorous 
competitions, a term of interaction for EU member countries was included in the 
regression. The estimated coefficient for the respective variable is negative and 
significant, leading to conclusion that EU membership is associated with a more 
competitive environment, which translates into a better access to finance (Cetrorelli, 
2003). 
Interesting results on assessing the effect of bank competition in U.S. are 
obtained by Cetrorelli & Strahan (2006). The results obtained by the authors shows 
that a higher competition on the U.S. market reduces the size of a typical firm, 
increases number of establishment and increases the share of establishments in the 
smallest size group. On the other hand, changes in completion do not influence large-
sized companies. This result is not surprising, since the large firms have access to 
financing through commercial papers, equity market, and other instruments of capital 
market. The analysis is based on panel data set of manufacturing firms that operated 
in U.S. between 1977 and 1994, consisting of survey conducted by Census Bureau, 
and provided by The County Business Patterns. Three separate regressions were run, 
with number of establishments, firm size and a measure of entire size distribution in 
the industry sector, as dependent variables. Control variables included employment 
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share, market trends (as proxy for any local market, time-varying effect on industry 
structure), industry trends and bank dependence variable. 
Another work by the same authors (Peachey & Roe, 2006) “Access to 
Finance: what does it mean and how do Savings Banks Foster access” provides 
evidence that saving banks facilitate the development towards a wider access to 
finance for transition economies. Although savings banks are not a substitute for 
commercial banks or microfinance institutions, they to play an important in the 
spectrum of institutions that foster access to finance.  
Foreign banks participation also has a major influence for firm‟s access to 
finance, but the effects that the participation can be different. Clarke, Cull, & Pería 
(2006) combine firm-level data coming from enterprise survey (about 3000 entries) 
with the indicators of foreign banks participation across 35 developing countries. The 
firm-level data consists of survey conducted by World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) in 1999. Marco indicators are extracted from World Development Indicators 
(World Banks). The dependent variables of the regression are: the response of 
enterprise managers to questions about whether high interest rates, access to long-
term loans, and access to non-bank equity represents an impediment to enterprise 
operations and growth All variables are limited dependent variables, with four 
discrete values corresponding, in ascending order, to no obstacle, minor obstacle, 
moderate obstacle, and major obstacle. The explanatory variables are: size, foreign 
bank participation, interaction term between size and foreign bank participation, a 
vector for the firm characteristics and a vector for the country characteristics. The 
interaction term between size and foreign bank participation was added in order to 
test whether the activity of foreign banks has the same impact on firms of all sizes. 
The results show that a higher share of assets of foreign banks in total banking assets 
is associated with the fact that high interest rates and access to long-term loans are 
perceived as lesser obstacles in firm‟s operation and growth. The estimates for 
interaction term between foreign bank participation and firm size reject the 
hypothesis that foreign bank participation is more benefic for large companies. 
Hence, the authors conclude that “…foreign bank participation may improve the 
perceptions of SME managers that high interest rates and limited access to long-term 
loans affect adversely their possibility of obtaining external financing” (Clarke, Cull, 
& Pería, 2006). 
Detragiache, Gupta, & Tressel (2006) study the effect of foreign bank 
penetration on the development of the financial sector in poor countries. The analysis 
is restricted to the list of countries, defined by World Bank as low income or lower 
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middle income, counting in total 89 countries (some emerging economies like Russia 
or Brazil are also included in the dataset). In the country-level regressions, several 
countries (China P.R., Eritrea, Jordan and Thailand) are excluded as being outliers 
with respect to private credit share. A cross-sectional regression consists of share of 
private credits in GDP as dependent variable, and the share of total banks assets held 
by foreign banks as explanatory variable. The matrix of control variables include 
GDP per capita growth, lack of corruption index, assets of state-owned banks, credit 
information index, population, and other country-level indicators. Bank-level 
regression contains logs of loan-loss provisions of the bank as dependent variable, 
vectors for bank level characteristics, and one for country-level fixed effects, and a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the bank is foreign-owned. The results of 
estimation showed that an increase in the share of foreign-owned banks leads to a 
decline in the private credit of about six percentage points of GDP. Bank-level 
regression yields that foreign-owned banks provision less for bad loans, compared to 
domestic banks (Detragiache, Gupta, & Tressel, 2006). The concluding statements of 
the paper are that while there are some benefits of foreign banks entrance on the 
domestic market, these benefits are not warranted. Entry by foreign banks may results 
in cream skimming which increases overall operating costs, and decreases aggregate 
welfare. Also, in all possible equilibrium, foreign-owned bank entry will probably 
only benefit more transparent firms, while other firms will either be indifferent or 
worse off (Detragiache, Gupta, & Tressel, 2006). 
Clarke, Cull, & Pería (2006) use data on the share of foreign-owned banks it 
total banking sector assets in over 100 developing countries between 1995 and 2002. 
The authors regress the changes in foreign banks participation on several variables: 
matrix that contains data on inflation and output growth, banking index (which 
provides an image on the level of restriction of banking restrictions in the country, 
provided by Heritage Foundation), property right index (which measures the level of 
protection of property rights), markets size (log of GDP in averaged from 1995 to 
2002), initial foreign participation (share assets held by foreign-owned banks in 
1995-96), regional dummies, and a dummy for crisis period. The results of estimation 
show that foreign banks participation had increased considerably in Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia and Latin America. At a lower rate, foreign bank participation also 
increased in Africa. On the other hand, the mentioned indicator remained the same, or 
even decreased in East and South Asia, in the Middle East and North Africa. The 
empirical study shows that countries that experienced baking crisis between 1995 and 
2002 tend to have a high foreign-owned banks participation rate, than those who did 
not experience crisis in banking segment. Additional regressions reflect that 
participation of foreign-owned banks tended to increase as a result of banking crisis, 
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rather than before to them. Also, post-crisis increase in share of foreign bank in total 
banking assets to not coincide with a better provision of credit to private sector, 
which leads the author to the conclusion that this happened “because foreign entrance 
acquired distressed bank, with a higher share of loans that needed to be written of” 
(Clarke, Cull, & Pería, 2006). By contrast, countries with high bank participation 
before the crisis tend to have high and stable level of credit to private sector. 
Hainz & Nabokin (2009) state that the impact of foreign-state banks is 
significant on the use of loans, but not on the access to finance. The authors state that 
firms are more likely to have a loan in countries with higher share of foreign-owned 
bank, but their presence does not improve the access itself. 
The role of state-owned banks on the level of access to finance also should not 
be disregarded. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2004) analyze cross-section 
data on firms access to credit for 74 countries (provided by WBES), and the results 
show that state-owned banks might be helping in increasing access to finance in 
countries with low concentration in banking sector, and that bank concentration has 
an impact on access to finance only in banking systems with state-owned banks. 
Richer countries tend to have higher level of institutional development, which 
translates into fewer restrictions on in banking segment, and a lower share of state-
owned banks in the banking system. General conclusion on the impact of state-owned 
banks would be that they contribute to a lower access to finance for firms (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004). 
Volz (2008) also studies the determinants of access to finance in TCs based on 
the data extracted from BEEPS database for year 2005. The dependent variable of the 
regression is the enterprise qualification of access to finance (from 1 from “no 
obstacle” to 4 for “major obstacle”). A qualitative response regression model, more 
exactly, Ordered Logitmodel is applied on the dataset. Explanatory variables contain 
one firm-level variable – size, and several country-level variables: financial 
deepening in the country, share of foreign-owned and state-owned banks, variables 
for macroeconomic environment, and other indicators. The obtained results show that 
a heavy relianceon foreign and state-owned banks has adverse effects on theaverage 
firms‟ access to finance. Also, the authors find that a higher concentrationin the 
banking sector leads to better financing conditions for firms.  
De Haas, Ferreira, & Taci(2007) find that foreign-owned banks are relatively 
highly involved in mortgage lending and lending tosubsidiaries of foreign-owned 
firms, in the same time lending relatively less to large domestic firms. Beside, the 
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study yields the unsurprising result that state-owned banks tend to lend more to state-
owned firms than private banks do.  
Another factor to be considered for influence on access to finance is the 
financial depth of the banking sector. Claessens & Tzioumis (2006), state that 
“Monitoring the supply-side of financing is important since firms‟ access to finance 
is more depend on financial development compared to household financing”. The 
authors show the relationship between financial depth and financing constrains based 
on the data collected in the FSDI. Financial constrain is measured by the median 
Kaplan-Zingales index across non-financial listed firms. The mentioned index is 
based on the premise that firms, which face financial constrain, can be defined as 
those that face a wedge between external and internal funds (Kaplan & Zingales, 
1997). The index takes higher value for firms that are financially constrained. Figure 
2.2 reflects the negative relationship between financial constrain and depth.  
Figure 2.2: Financial depth and financing constrains 
Source: Claessens & Tzioumis (2006) 
Beck et all (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, The determinants 
of financing obstacles, 2006) study the firm-level data for 80 developed and 
developing countries around the world, provided by WBES. The authors regress the 
variables for financial obstacle (which, as mentioned earlier, can take value from 1 to 
4, from “no obstacle” to “major obstacle” correspondingly) on firm and country 
characteristics. Firm characteristics include log of age, size (log of sales or size 
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dummies), ownership dummies, sectorial dummies and dummies for listed firms and 
business-group firms. The estimations show that higher level of financial 
intermediary development, higher GDP per capita, more liquidity on stock marker 
and a more efficient legal system contribute to a better access to finance. But, one of 
the most important determinants, according to the authors, is institutional 
development (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, The determinants of 
financing obstacles, 2006). 
Cull & Xu(2005) study the survey for Chinese firm conducted by World Bank 
(jointly with the Enterprise SurveyOrganization of China), that captures the period 
between 2000 and 2002. The authors find that access to bank loans by private firms 
was positively and statistically significantly associated with reinvestment rates. The 
analysis of data for Chinese firms also shows that astransition progresses and as 
competition tightness, the complexity of transactions also rises. Hence, the role if 
financial institutions becomes more important for firm growth(Cull & Xu, 2005). 
Brown, Jappelli, & Pagano(2009) investigate if information sharing among 
banks had an impact on credit market performance in the TCs of Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union. Country-level data on information sharing is extracted from the 
World Bank/IFC “Doing Business” database, and is combined with firm-level data in 
credit availability, provided by BEEPS, provided by EBRD and World Bank. The 
cross-sectional and panel analysis show that information sharing is associated with 
improvements in access to finance, and also lower costs of credits, especially in TC 
with lower level of investment protection. Cross-sectional estimates lead to 
conclusion that information sharing and firm-level accounting transparency are 
substitutes in increasing access to credit financing. Panel estimates suggest that 
information sharing plays a substitution role in the protection of creditor rights only 
in the country where the level of respective protection is low, but not also in countries 
where creditor rights are also efficiently protected by law (Brown, Jappelli, & 
Pagano, 2009).Contrary, De Haas, Ferreira, & Taci(2007) state that all types of bank 
customerstend to profit from legal improvements. 
Hainz & Nabokin (2009) come to conclusion that information sharing is not 
equally benefic for firms of all sizes. Thus, small firms do not benefit more from 
information sharing than medium and large-sized ones, and firms from countries, 
where the level of protection of creditor rights is weak, benefit less from better 
information sharing. And, in contrast, for opaque firms access to finance is easier in 
countries that have information sharing agreements.  
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2.4 Internal determinants of access to finance 
Size is one of the most important determinants of how access to finance is 
perceived by firms. Also Beck et all (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, 
The determinants of financing obstacles, 2006), in the paper mentioned above, find 
that small firms report significantly higher obstacles to finance than middle-sized 
firms, and both of these categories report higher financial obstacles than large firms. 
They also conclude that reported financial obstacles tend to get lower with the 
increase of age of enterprise. Also, the ownership of the firm has its impact on 
reported obstacles in access to finance: foreign-owned firms report lower values of 
obstacles. On the other hand, state-owned companies report higher values of 
obstacles, but the results is only significant at 10% level, and only in one 
specification. Regarding the domain of activity, manufacturing, agriculture and 
construction firms report higher values of obstacles in access to finance (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, The determinants of financing obstacles, 
2006).  
Bougheas, Mizen, & Yalcin(2006) analyze the data for about 50.000 small, 
medium and large sized UK companies in order to assess what firm characteristics 
determine a company‟s level of access to bank and market finance. The data is 
provided by the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. The authors 
observe that firms with higher share of real assets tend to have a better access to long-
term debt and reduce their short-term debt. This confirms previous findings by Oliner 
& Rudebusch(1996) that suggest that small firms tend to finance through short-term 
debt because of severe credit market imperfection that they face. According to the 
authors, monetary contractions redirect credit from small firms to large firms.   
Also Bougheas, Mizen, & Yalcin(2006) show that the ratio of tangible assets 
increases access to long-term debt, reducing the proportion of short-term debt. 
Onwards, firms with more senior debt are less likely to obtain further access to credit.  
The analysis of difference in access to finance for private and public firms 
shows that these two categories face different credit supply conditions based on their 
specific characteristics, and show different response to changes in monetary policies 
(Bougheas, Mizen, & Yalcin, 2006). Thus, for private firms size, risk profile, 
profitability and age are more important as indicators of access to short-term and 
long-term debts, while the ratio of tangible assets is less important. In conclusions, 
the authors state that smaller, younger and more risky firms are affected more by 
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monetary contractions than larger, older and more secure companies, the result which 
could be expected.  
Hainz & Nabokin(2009) in their study on determinants of finance, construct 
two regressions equations: one for use of finance, and one for access to finance, both 
dependent variables being binary. The variables for use takes value equal to 1 if firm 
has a loan and zero if otherwise. The authors use this codification in order to 
differentiate between firms that are financial constrained and those that do not exhibit 
demand for loans. This way, only firms that demand a loan can be included in the 
analysis of access to finance, which would make the study more accurate. The 
variable for access takes value equal to one if a firm has a loan, and zero if a firm had 
applied for one, but had been rejected. The authors use BEEPS data for 24 TCs, 
which sum up to 6659 firm observations. The model applied is probit estimations. 
The estimation for the use of loan, applied by Hainz & Nabokin (2009), show 
that show that small-sized firms and state-owned firms are less likely to have loans. 
On the other hand, more transparent, and more profitable firms (according to 2003 
data) are more likely to use loans for financing. Age impact proved to be 
insignificant. Sectorial analysis shows that use of loan is less in almost all segments is 
less than in basic category, which include mining and quarrying.  
For the access for loans, Hainz & Nabokin (2009) find that small-sized firms 
and state-owned firms less often have access to finance. Also, transparent and 
profitable firms (according to 2003 data) more often have access to finance. Sectorial 
analysis shows that only firms activating in real estate, renting and business services 
have worse access to finance through loan than in the base sector (Hainz & Nabokin, 
2009). Volz (2008) as well concludes, based on the analysis of TCs data, that a large 
proportion of firms– and especially small-sized firms – have much worse access to 
finance. The importance of firm size is also confirmed by De Haas, Ferreira, & 
Taci(2007), which denote that small banks are more likely to lend to SMEs than large 
banks,while large banks have a comparative advantage in lending to large firms. 
As for age of firms, the authors (Hainz & Nabokin, 2009) conclude that firms 
in the age categories between 0 and 10 years and between 16 and 30 years are less 
likely to use a loan. As for access, the age variable does not seem to have a different 
impact on firms of different sizes. One mentionable fact is that firms with age 
between 16 and 30 years less frequently exhibit demand for loan. Also, the authors 
mention that insignificance of age on access to finance might hold only in that 
particular sample, which contains many firms that were founded and the start of 
transition period in 1989 (Hainz & Nabokin, 2009). The stated results lead authors to 
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the conclusion that information about the use of loans is not enough to identify 
neither the categories of firms that should be supported, neither the reforms that can 
be undertaken on the country level to enhance access to finance. Also, the results 
yield that in normal conditions sector-specific programs orientated to improve access 
to finance are senseless. 
Cull & Xu(2005), based on the study of Chinese firms‟ performance, provide 
evidence that the growth of employment, the total factor productivity and profitability 
are positively related to access to finance. This reveals the tendency of Chinese banks 
to direction the financing towards better performing firms. 
 
From the analysis of the studies mentioned above, a conclusion can be 
drowned: the impact of different determinants of access to finance is not 
unambiguous, and differ from sample to sample (both in time and country list 
chosen), and varies in dependence of techniques and models used in the analysis. 
Thus, a more specific approach should be approved when selecting the sample for 
studying the factors that influence the level of accessibility of finance. 
  










3.1 Chapter overview 
 
This chapter provides outlines on the methodological framework, applied in 
order to determine what factors do exercise influence on the access to finance for 
individual firms, and in what direction.  It contains a section that describes general 
situation in the banking sector in transition economies. It also includes data 
description, model specification, reasoning for choice of variables and author‟s 
prediction on the sign on of the estimated coefficients for the mentioned 
determinants.  
 
3.2 Characteristics of banking sector in TCs 
Transition economies, or transition countries, are the economies that are going 
through the change from centrally planned system to free market system (Fischer, 
Sahay, & Vegh, 1996).  The list of such countries for Central and Eastern Europe and 
central Asia includes former Yugoslavian countries and former Soviet Union 
Republics and its satellite states like Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland (The Internation 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Banks, 2002). Turkey, Mongolia, 
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and, recently, Kosovo, are also considered transition economies (EBRD, 2012), while 
Czech Republic is mention as the first country to graduate from the EBRD program 
(starting with 2007).  
Financial markets in TCs had a different path of formation than in countries 
with developed economies.  During the planned economy period, financial markets 
were only represented by the banks, which had the role of recordkeeping for the 
planning process and payment intermediates among state entities (Bonin & Wachtel, 
2003). So they did not perform the function of resource storage and reallocation that a 
bank normally has in a market-based economy. Stock markets in TCs formed as a 
result of mass-privatization, during which most of the property rights were mandatory 
transmitted from state to private ownership (Claessens S. D., 2001). Thus, stock 
markets did not execute the function of capital raising, but were a mechanism of 
transmission of property rights, or, later, consolidation of property rights. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that financial market in transition countries are mostly dominated 
by banks (Bonin & Wachtel, 2003). Although financial markets in all TCs have its 
own specifics, Volz (2008) affirms that there are three common characteristics for 
financial markets in TCs: financial depth in TCs is relatively small compared to 
develop countries, even until now; banking activities are dominant; and, in most TCs, 
banking segment can be characterized by high participation of foreign players and a 
high concentration ratio. The conditions of formation and initial scopes of stock 
markets it TCs translated into another common characteristic of most such markets: 
low liquidity and very high volatility of prices (Andjelic & Djakovic, 2012).  
Regulation of financial markets in TCs is also a matter of discussions and 
debates (Fischer, Sahay, & Vegh, 1996), as implication in capital market “natural” 
mechanism may lead to undesired results. An example could be the law in Moldova 
from 2000 that prohibited any over-the-counter transactions with stakes higher than 
1% of total shares issued by a company (total amount of transaction between two 
parties during one year could not exceed that limit). This lead to stagnation in the 
process of consolidation of ownership, to drastic decrease in new share issue, and 
diminished or even stopped the growth and development of many enterprises 
(analysis of CNPF
1
 Moldova database).  
                                                 
1
National Commision for Financial Markets of Moldova 
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Figure 3.1 and 3.2 depicts the share to private sector in GDP, compared to the 
share of stock markets capitalization in GDP, in TCs, in 2002 and 2009 respectively.  
Figure 3.1: Share of Bank private Credit vs. Stock Marker Capitalization, 2002 
Figure 3.2: Share of Bank Private Credit vs. Stock Marker Capitalization, 2009 
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As it can be seen from the figures, although in case of some countries like, 
Kazakhstan, Romania and Turkey, stock markets play as significant role in resource 
allocation as banking sector, in most countries banking activities are still dominating 
on financial markets. The average share of stock market in GDP in Euro area was 
33% in 2009, for high-income countries it was 34.5%, while the same ratio for US for 
the same year was 96.9% (The Global Financial Development Database). Also, an 
increases in financial deepening is easy noticeable from the figures above. 
Figure 3.3 portray the share of foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks in 
total banking assets in 1996
2
. A bank is classified as foreign-owned or state-owned if 
foreign, or, respectively, state ownerships exceed more that 50%. 
 
Figure 3.3: Share of state-owned and foreign-owned banks in total bank assets, 
1996 
Source: EBRD Country Database. 
As it easily observable from the diagram, in 1996, state-owned banks have the 
dominant position on the banking sector. Only a few countries do not follow this 
trend: in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Latvia foreign-owned banks 
                                                 
2
For Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine the information was not available for 1996, 
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dominated the markets, while in Georgia and FYR Macedonia there are no banks 
with the majority of ownership belonging to the state, according to EBRD Country 
Database.  But the situation will reverse in time.  
In Figure 3.4 are presented the shares of the share of foreign-owned banks and 




Figure 3.4: Share of state-owned and foreign-owned banks in total bank assets, 
2009 
Source: EBRD Country Database. 
By 2009, the picture is completely different: state-owned banks are not 
playing the determinant role anymore, as they are forced out by foreign-owned banks. 
Only in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Turkey and Turkmenistan state-owned banks 
still play the most significant role. In most of other countries, the share of state-
owned bank approaches zero. In number of states (Albania, Armenia, etc.) the share 
of assets of state-owned banks is zero or almost zero. 
                                                 
3
For Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, Serbia and Turkmenistan the data vor 2008 was included, since the 
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Among other trends in evolution of financial markets in TCs can be 
mentioned a relatively high concentration in banking sector compared to developed 
European countries (the respective indicator is measured as share of assets of 5 
largest bank in total banking assets). Also, since 1989 EBRD measures several 
transition indicators for assessment of transition progress, among which the index of 
banking sector reform and the index of reform of securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions. The indexes take values of 1.0 for all countries in 1989, and can 
take maximum value of 4.0, which represents that market fulfills the standards of 
industrialized market economy. Figure 3.5 depicts the value of the mentioned 
indexesin 2009. 
Figure 3.5: Indexes for banking sector reform and Securities market reform, 
2009 
Source: EBRD Country Database. 
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It can be seen from the above figure that most of the countries had made 
significant progress in the field of reformation and liberalization of banking sector 
and securities market. The “offsiders” of this process are Turkmenistan for banking 
sector reforms, and Turkmenistan and Tajikistan for the securities market reforms, for 
which the level of liberalization of respective markets did not change since 1989 
(according to EBRD). The absolute leader in financial market liberalization is 
Hungary, which is receiving highest value for the index of banking sector reform 
since 1997 and for reform of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 
since 2005. 
Thus, it can be concluded that since the switch from planned to market-based 
economy, overall, TCs made significant improvement in developing the financial 
markets and in providing financial resources to the enterprises. Although the access 
to finance and these countries is still not as wide as in developed economies, the 
evolution of the indicators mentioned above permit very optimistic expectations. 
 
 
3.3 Main hypotheses of study 
As it was mentioned in the discussion on the literature overview section, 
access to finance is highly dependent on evolutions of financial markets, especially in 
transition economies, but also on some firm specific characteristics. Considering all 
arguments in favor or in opposition of effects of particular determinants on access to 
finance, the following hypotheses were formulated for the present study: 
H1: High implication of foreign-banks in banking assets increases access to 
finance. 
H2: Bank sector and securities market liberalization help eliminate obstacles 
in access to finance. 
H3: Higher level of corruption is associated with lower access to external 
financing. 
H4: Companies that operate in service sector of economy benefit from a 
better access to finance. 
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H5: Firms that apply for external audit of financial statement face fewer 
obstacles in obtaining finance. 
Additionally, the influence on access to finance of size and ownership type of 




3.4 Data and methodology description 
The dataset for the study is constructed by combination of firm-level 
information with country level indicators. The information about enterprises is taken 
from the BEEPS database, provided by World Banks. It represents a survey that 
examines the quality of business environment in TCs, which concerns different 
situations of interactions between state and enterprises. It was implemented at a join 
initiative of the EBRD and the World Bank Group (the World Bank). The survey was 
conducted in several four rounds: 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2009. For the purpose of 
present thesis, only last free round will be taken in consideration. The survey for year 
2002 contains information on for 27 TCs (East Europe and Central Asia, including 
Turkey, but excluding Turkmenistan) and approximately 6,500 enterprises. The 2005 
survey includes data for 28 countries and about 9,500 firms. The 2009 survey covers 
data for 29 countries (including Mongolia) for around 11,800 enterprises. The survey 
contains both quantitative data, along with questions that regard the perception of 
firms towards different obstacles that they face in their activities.  
The question of using survey as an instrument of measure for access to 
finance in empirical analyses has been raised in several papers (See Volz (2008), 
Claessens &Tzioumis (2006), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt&Maksimovic (2004) and 
others). Generally it is accepted that although self-reporting is subjective by nature, 
surveys are a good way of substitution for lack of official detailed data on SME 
(Claessens &Tzioumis, 2006). SME are normally not obliged to report detailed 
financial statements, which makes econometric studies impossible for respective 
segment. Using financial aggregates also might be inefficient in testing many 
hypotheses regarding all types of enterprises. Also, Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & 
Schankerman(2000) show that there is little evidence of country-perception bias in 
BEEPS, and that there is a tight connection between responses and measurable 
results. Finally, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic(2004) find that enterprises 
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report lower access to finance in countries with higher net interest margins (as a 
measure of availability of credits), which speaks in favor of efficiency of surveys in 
measuring access to finance.   
Country-level information was extracted from The Global Financial 
Development Database (The World Banks Data Bank) and from macroeconomic data 
provided by EBRD. The final sample of countries includes 27 transitions countries
4
. 
Turkey and Mongolia were omitted since for these countries there was not enough 
information on country level indicators.  
 
3.4.1 Model specification 
Based on stated hypotheses and assumption discussed in the overview of 
existing studies on question of access to finance (especially on the papers by Volz 
(2008) and Hainz & Nabokin (2009)), the following specification of the model is 
considered for estimations: 
𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒋 =  𝜶𝟏𝒄𝒑𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒋 + 𝜶𝟐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒋 + 𝜶𝟑𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒋 + 𝜶𝟒𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒋
+ 𝜶𝟓𝒇𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉𝒋 + 𝜶𝟔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒋 + 𝜶𝟕𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒋 + 𝜶𝟖 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒋
+ 𝜶𝟗 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒋 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒋  + 𝜶𝟏𝟏 𝒂𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒋 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐 𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒋
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒋 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒋 +  𝜺𝒊𝒋 
Where, 
𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒋: Access to finance for firm i in country j; 
𝒄𝒑𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒋: Annual change in CPI in country j; 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒋: Share of state-owned banks in total banking assets in country j; 
𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒋: Share of foreign-owned banks in total banking assets in country j; 
𝒇𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉𝒋: Financial depth in country j; 
                                                 
4
 List of TC: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz republic, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
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𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒋: Assessment of reforms in banking sector in country j; 
𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒋: Assessment of reforms in securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions in country j; 
𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒋: Corruption Perception Index in country j; 
 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒋: Size of the firm i in country j; 
 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒋: Service sector dummy for firm i in country j; 
 𝒂𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒋: Dummy for audit situation of firm i in country j; 
 𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒋: Dummy variables for sole ownership type of the enterprises, of firm i in 
country j. 
 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒋: Dummy variables for privately held/limited liability company 
ownership, respectively, of firm i in country j. 
Additionally, a separate regression will be run with the inclusion of dummy 
variable for crisis period (year 2009). The specifics of the additional regression will 
be discussed in the results section. 
 
3.4.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is an ordinal variable, which represents the enterprise 
response to the BEEPS survey question about the assessment of obstacles in 
accessing finance. The possible responses are: “No obstacle”, “Minor obstacle”, 
“Moderate obstacle”, “Major obstacle” and “Very severe obstacle”. Last option was 
introduced only 2009 survey. The variable is codded as following: 0=“No obstacle”, 
1=“Minor obstacle”, 2=“Moderate obstacle”, 3=“Major obstacle” and 4=“Very 
severe obstacle”. 
Therefore, the regression model suitable for estimations with ordinal 
dependent variable is multinomial logistic regression, and more exactly, Generalized 
Ordered Logit, using Stata command gologit2 (Williams, 2006). The specified model 
is less restrictive that other models from proportional odds family, whose 
assumptions may be often violated, and more parsimonious than modelsas 
Multinomial Logit,which ignore the ordering of categories (Williams, 2006).The 
Brant test of parallel regression assumption applied on the estimates obtained by 
Ordered Logit showed that the model does indeed violate the specified assumption. 
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Another strong point of Generalized Ordered Logit model is that it allows analyzing 
the changes in explanatory variables coefficient estimates across the categories of 
explanatory variables (for example, the value of the same explanatory variable for 
“No obstacle” compared to “Very severe obstacle” response option), which permits a 
more deep analysis of behavior of variables.  
 
3.4.3Explanatory variable 
The description of the explanatory variables, both external and internal, the 
intuition behind the choice of indicators, as well as sources for data for the variables 
follows below. Also, predictions for sign of coefficient estimates are also included. 
 
a. External determinants of access to finance 
 Change in CPI 
A volatile macroeconomic environment translates into higher risks associated 
with investment, and hence, higher risk premium or higher collateral margin is 
demanded, which narrows the access to finance. The volatility of macroeconomic 
conditions can be assessed through the changes in CPI index (Volz, An Empirical 
Examination of Firms‟ Financing Conditions in Transition Countries, 2008). The data 
on the yearly change in CPI in TCs for year 2002, 2005 and 2009 was extracted from 
The Global Financial Development Database. It is expected that higher values of 
changes in CPI are associated with lower level of access to finance, thus, the 
coefficient for the variable estimates should be positive. 
 Concentration in banking sector 
As already mentioned in the literature overview, there is no univocal opinion 
about the effect of concentration in banking sector on access to finance (for example, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2004) and Volz (2008) obtain opposed results 
for the impact of concentration on the access to finance). Concentration in banking 
sector is measures as share of assets 5 largest banks in total banking assets of a 
country. Highly concentrated banking systems tend to favor large-sized enterprises. 
On the other hand, Volz (2008) states that “a high concentration in banking might 
create aquasi-monopolistic situation, which could help banks to establisha mutually 
beneficial relationship with firms”.The value of this indicator for TCs for the years 
corresponding to surveys was taken from EBRD macroeconomic database. It is 
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expected that higher concentration in banking sectors leads to worse access to 
finance, hence the coefficient estimates is expected to have positive sign. 
 Share of state-owned banks in total banking assets 
The implication of state-owned banks can have both positive and negative 
effect on access to finance. On one hand, state-owned banks are less restrictive in 
screening the firms that apply for a loan, or, they can widen loan granting as part of 
policies for support of enterprises. On the other hand, in countries where state-owned 
banks face no competition, they might be more rigid and less efficient in resource 
allocation and less willing to offer a more diversified range of financial products. 
Thus, no sign prediction is made for variable of implication state-owned banks. The 
data on the share of state-owned banks in total banking assets was extracted from The 
Global Financial Development Database. 
 Share of foreign-owned banks in total banking assets 
The same conclusion as for state-owned banks can be stated also for foreign-
owned banks: the influence of foreign-owned banks on access to finance in not 
unambiguous. They can contribute to better access to finance through fostering 
competition, through offering financial market instrument and innovative approaches 
that are not available for local banks, through more efficient approach to financial 
intermediation, and others. At the same time, foreign-owned banks might be more 
restrictive in client screening and focus only on large or very profitable landing, 
which would lower the access to finance and small and medium enterprises, and 
favor only large companies. Based on the arguments stated above, the predicted sign 
for the coefficient estimates is negative. The values of the mentioned indicator for 
TCs were taken from The Global Financial Development Database. 
 Financial depth 
Generally, a higher degree of financial depth is associated with better access 
to finance. Financial depth is generally calculated as share of private credit in the 
GDP (Honohan, 2008). Although banking sector is not the only source of financing 
for firms, in TCs it heavily dominates over the capital marking, thus the mentioned 
ratio is a good measurefor financial depth of the market. Higher values of financial 
depth indicator reflect that a bigger amount of financing is attracted through 
financials sector, thus, a negative sign is expected for financial depth variable. Source 
of data: The Global Financial Development Database. 
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 Assessment of reforms in banking sector 
The scope of reforms in banking sector is to create a framework for prudential 
and efficient framework for banking sector regulation and supervision, to achieve 
liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation, and to assure a high financial 
deepening. Thus, stronger progress in the field of liberalization of banking sector 
should be associated with a better access to finance. The index that reflects the 
progress in banking reforms for TCs is calculated by EBRD and is reflected in the 
EBRD macroeconomic database. 
 Assessment of reforms in securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions 
Reforms in field of securities market follow the goal to bring securities 
market regulation as closest as possible to IOSCO standards (IOSCO - International 
Organization of Securities Commissions), to guarantee the protection of property 
rights for companies and investors, to assure substantial market liquidity and 
capitalization and to guarantee a fully developed non-bank intermediation segment. 
Liberalized and efficiently regulated security markets should contribute to a better 
access to finance, allowing attracting larger amounts of capitals, both in forms of 
equity and doubt issue, at more competitive rates compared to banking sector. Hence, 
negative coefficients estimates for the mentioned reforms are anticipated in the 
analysis. The respective indexes are also calculated by EBRD and reflected in the 
EBRD macroeconomic database. 
 Corruption Perception Index 
In order to assess the impact of corruption level on access to finance, a 
variable for Corruption Perception Index was introduced in the regression. The data 
on the mentioned index was extracted from Transparency International database, as 
annual values for all three years of the analysis (which allows for evolutions in 
perception of corruption). The interpretation of the index should be the following: 
The higher the value of the Index, the higher the perception of corruption, and the 
lower the corruption level in the country. Thus, the coefficient estimates for the 
corruption variable should be negative. 
 Crisis impact 
A dummy variable for crisis period was included in the regression. It takes 
values equal to 1 for observations for year 2009, and equal to 0 otherwise. Naturally, 
the expected sign for coefficient estimates is positive.  
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b. Internal determinants of access to finance 
 Firm size  
As it was mentioned in the literature review, small firms face higher obstacles 
in access to finance. Since small enterprises are associated with higher riskiness and 
lack of credit history, thus such firms usually are forced to pay higher interest rates 
and provide a bigger collateral margin. Size variables is an ordinal variable that takes 
value equal to 1 for small firms (between 5 and 19 employees), equal to 2 for medium 
firms (from 20 to 99 employees), and equal to 3 for large firms (equal or more than 
100 employees). Thus, the negative sing is expected for the respective variable. 
 Service sector 
A dummy variable was created for firms that operate in the service segment of 
economy. Due to the fact that these companies typically have more liquid assets and 
higher profitability ratios, it is expected that they would face less obstacle in 
obtaining external financing. The variable takes value equal to 1 if enterprise 
describes its main activity as wholesale, retail, IT, hotel and restaurants industry, or 
other services, or value equal to 0 otherwise.   
 Audit 
A dummy variable was introduces in the model to assess if enterprises, whose 
financial statement are audited by an external auditor, face less obstacles in access to 
finance compared to whose are not. The variable takes value equal to 1 if external 
audit was performed during last complete fiscal year, and equal to 0 if otherwise. 
Enterprises that apply for an external audit should gain better access to finance, thus 
the sign for coefficient estimates is anticipated to be negative. 
 Legal status 
In order to test whether firm ownership has any impact on access to finance, 
dummy variables, with value 1 were introduces for firms with sole ownership and 
privately held or limited liability companies, and 0 if firms state any other form of 
ownership.  
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In Table 3.1 are summarized the descriptive statistics for variables considered 
as internal determinants for access to finance, outline above, and reflects the sign 
prediction for coefficient estimates. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for variables for internal determinants 
 
Source: author’s computations.  
 
Appendix A contains values of mentioned determinants for years 2002, 2005 
and 2009, respectively. It is worth mentioning that while for some particular variable 
outliers are present (as extremely high change in CPI for Belarus in 2002), omitting 
the outliers does not changes the estimation results. The reason is that for these 
countries data for some other variables is missing, and the model doe not include the 
observation with missing data into estimation. 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sign prediction 
cpidelta 23613 6.070 6.131 -0.74 42.54 + 
concentr 24091 72.751 18.432 33.80 100.00 + 
state 22533 16.284 19.838 0.00 77.90 +/– 
foreign 23640 52.063 32.122 1.78 99.40 – 
fdepth 24507 34.380 22.311 0.00 103.30 – 
banklib 24366 2.921 0.676 1.00 4 – 
secmarlib 24366 2.463 0.726 1.00 4 – 
corrup 23783 3.370 1.169 1.70 6.60 + 
crisis 24959 0.389 0.488 0 1 + 
size 24927 1.757 0.796 1 3 – 
serv 24959 0.458 0.498 0 1 – 
audit 24959 0.455 0.498 0 1 – 
sole 24959 0.269 0.443 0 1 +/– 
private 24959 0.364 0.481 0 1 +/– 







4:Results and Interpretation 
 
 
4.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter presents the empirical results, obtained by applying the 
methodology described in Chapter 3 of the present thesis. The chapter includes the 
results originated from the initial specification of the regression model, the discussion 
on possible issues and solutions, and the outcome from the updated methodology. 
The last section contains the interpretation of obtained signs for coefficient estimates 
of explanatory variables of access to finance.  
 
4.2 Initial specification 
As mentioned in the methodology section, Generalized Ordered Logit is 
applied on pseudo panel data for 27 TCs. The advantage on the specified model is 
that it provides more extended and interpretable results, compared to such models as 
Ordered Logit or Multinomial Logit, more exactly, how the coefficient varies with 
change of dependent variables. This stratification is obtained by running the n-1 
logistic regressions (where n in the number of possible values of dependent variable) 
by the following procedure: 1
st
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In the case of the analyzed dataset, the dependent variable can take 5 values 
(ranging from 0 to 4), which implies that the output generated by Generalized 
Ordered Logit should contain estimates for 4 regressions. Table 4.1 presents the 
estimation outcomes of the model described in the methodology section. 
Table 4.1:Results for determinants of access to finance. Initial model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
cpidelta -0.00107 0.00493* 0.00470 -0.0529*** 
 (0.00305) (0.00281) (0.00321) (0.00860) 
concentr -0.0122*** -0.0122*** -0.0149*** -0.0309*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00120) (0.00140) (0.00297) 
state 0.00490*** 0.00251** 0.00473*** -0.000333 
 (0.00121) (0.00111) (0.00130) (0.00263) 
foreign 0.00776*** 0.0104*** 0.0124*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.000790) (0.000772) (0.000959) (0.00227) 
fdepth 0.00136 0.00304*** 0.00230** 0.0324*** 
 (0.000949) (0.000900) (0.00105) (0.00217) 
banklib -0.657*** -0.736*** -0.768*** -2.170*** 
 (0.0729) (0.0706) (0.0848) (0.218) 
secmarlib 0.405*** 0.472*** 0.506*** 0.954*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0404) (0.0473) (0.110) 
corrup -0.123*** -0.156*** -0.162*** -0.391*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0209) (0.0258) (0.0569) 
size -0.125*** -0.117*** -0.151*** 0.0541 
 (0.0218) (0.0209) (0.0242) (0.0446) 
serv -0.298*** -0.221*** -0.234*** -0.184*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0307) (0.0358) (0.0701) 
audit -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.200*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0282) 
sole 0.0601 -0.0765* -0.156*** -0.276** 
 (0.0436) (0.0408) (0.0477) (0.116) 
private -0.101*** -0.0972*** -0.0186 0.289*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0355) (0.0412) (0.0822) 
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Constant 2.946*** 2.110*** 1.176*** 2.463*** 
 (0.188) (0.179) (0.210) (0.452) 
     
Observations 19,206 19,206 19,206 19,206 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: author’s computations 
The examination of obtained results indicates some possible problems with 
the model specification. Most unexpected outcomes are marked with bold in Table 
4.1. First, the sing for coefficient estimates for change in CPI (cpidelta) alters along 
the increase in value of dependent variable: the sing is negative for extreme values of 
dependent variable, and positive for middle categories. Secondly, the sing for 
variable for implication of state-owned banks (state) changes from positive to 
negative in the 4
th
 equation. A straightforward explanation for this shift would be that 
the implication of state-owned banks is less likely to determine the enterprises to 
report extremely high obstacles in accessing the external finance. But such an 
interpretation would be a more mechanical one, and it is more likely that there is 
some problem with variable or model specification.  
Another noticeable deviation in results is that the coefficient estimates for the 
variable for financial depth (fdepth) are positive, which would imply that higher 
deepening of financial systems lead to worse access to finance – the results which 
would contravene the findings of previous studies on access to finance (Claessens & 
Tzioumis (2006), Volz (2008) and others).  
As regarding internal determinants of access to finance, the unexpected results 
are also obtained for the size variable and the dummy for companies that are 
organized as private ownership. A positive sing for size variable for the 4
th
 equation 
would lead to conclusion that big companies are more likely to report very severe 
obstacles in accessing the external finance. Such a result would contradict many 
anterior studies and would be hardly explainable. The same reasoning doubts the 
negative sign of coefficient estimates for the dummy for privately held, limited 
liability companies (private). 
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The robustness check for the model also showed that the results of the model 
are not stable and that further work on the model has to be done
5
. Also, one of the 
purposes of the present thesis is to check whether crisis period had any impact in the 
access to finance. But introducing a dummy variable for crisis period yields even 
more unstable results, and causes the regressions model to violate the parallel lines 
assumption (the assumption that the impact of independent variables is the same for 
all response categories). 
Also, the check for correlations between external determinants to access to 
finance shows that the variables banklib and secmarlibare highly correlated, which 
might cause the problem of multicollinearity. Table 4.2 reflects the correlation 
between external determinants of access to finance.  
Table 4.2:Correlation between external determinants of access to finance 
 
cpidelta concentr state foreign fdepth banklib secmarlib corrup 
cpidelta 1.000 
       concentr -0.272 1.000 
      state 0.464 -0.232 1.000 
     foreign -0.404 0.416 -0.500 1.000 
    fdepth -0.081 -0.163 -0.245 0.297 1.000 
   banklib -0.404 0.108 -0.474 0.669 0.562 1.000 
  secmarlib -0.292 0.147 -0.138 0.434 0.420 0.789 1.000 
 corrup -0.240 0.428 -0.289 0.498 0.414 0.645 0.601 1.000 
 
Source: author’s computations 
The robustness check points that the variable banklib changes sign to positive 
and becomes insignificant when the variable secmarlib is omitted from the 
regression, which denotes that some modification in specification of the variables is 
necessary. Although one of the solutions to the problem of multicollinearity created 
by the respective variables could be dropping one of them (in case of current study – 
the dropped variable would be secmarlib, since financing through securities market in 
TCs is substantially lower than compared to financing by banking sector), the matter 
can also be addressed by principal component analysis. The respective procedure 
                                                 
5
The robustness check was performed by running several equations in which the explanatory variables 
were omitted one by one. This permits to verify if sign of coefficients are the same for all 
specifications.   
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allows converting sets of correlated data into values of linearly uncorrelated 
variables,defined as principal components.  
Taking in consideration all model flows mentioned in the current section, a 
modified regression methodology is applied on the data, in order to assure a more 
efficient and objective outcome. 
 
 
4.3 Modified methodology 
As mentioned in the methodology section of Chapter 3, the dependent 
variable of the performed analysis is the enterprise response on the question of their 
perception of access to finance. The variables can take several values: from 0 for “No 
obstacle”, to 4 for “Very severe obstacle”. As also remarked in the same section, the 
option “Very severe obstacle” was introduced only in surveys for year 2009, while in 
2005 and 2005 the highest obstacle response would be “Major obstacle”. Thus, if a 
dummy variable for year 2009 is included in the regression, it causes violation of 
parallel lines assumption and produces highly unstable results. In order to account for 
crisis effect, all observation, for which the dependent variable obtained value equal to 
4, were omitted. Therefore, the regression output should contain coefficients for only 
3 equations.  
Also, the variables banksec was created using principal component analysis, 
to deal with the correlation between bank sector liberalization index and securities 
market liberalization index. The comparison of the likehood ratio and pseudo R
2
 
shows that the model including banksec variable fits the data better than the one that 
assumes dropping the variable for securities market liberalization, and keeping only 
bank sector liberalization index variable. The results obtained by applying the 
outlined modified methodology are reflected in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3:Results for determinants of access to finance. Modified methodology 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
cpidelta 0.00634** 0.0131*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.00311) (0.00292) (0.00338) 
concentr -0.00521*** -0.00521*** -0.00521*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
  37 
state 0.00798*** 0.00596*** 0.00956*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00103) (0.00124) 
foreign 0.00308*** 0.00554*** 0.00795*** 
 (0.000711) (0.000704) (0.000853) 
fdepth -0.00741*** -0.00741*** -0.00741*** 
 (0.000990) (0.000990) (0.000990) 
banksec 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
corrup -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
size -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0216) (0.0266) 
serv -0.301*** -0.232*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0314) (0.0386) 
audit -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
sole 0.0883** -0.0345 -0.152*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0406) (0.0479) 
private -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0331) 
crisis 0.301*** 0.339*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0420) (0.0478) 
Constant 1.808*** 0.822*** -0.338*** 
 (0.101) (0.0983) (0.109) 
    
Observations 18,293 18,293 18,293 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: author’s computations 
The specified model does not yield volatile or unexplainable results. The 
robustness check of the regression, as well as a more detailed regression output, are 
presented in Appendix B. The sign for financial depth is negative, as expected, which 
confirms that higher financial deepening is associated with better access to finance. 
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The coefficient estimates for change in CPI is stably positive. The outcomes for size 
and private are also show that the last specification of model is more consistent. Also, 
the Wald test for parallel lines assumption shows that the modified model does not 
violate the proportional odds/parallel lines assumption.  
 
 
4.4 Results interpretation 
Since access to finance is measured by ordinal variables, with increasing 
values for higher obstacles in accessing external financing, a negative sign of 
coefficient estimates should be interpreted as an increase in access to finance, and a 
positive one – as leading to worse conditions of access to finance, as perceived by 
enterprises. 
 Change in CPI (cpidelta) 
As expected, the results yield positive sign for coefficient estimates for 
change in CPI, which allows concluding that a more volatile and thus more risky 
macroeconomic environment, described by higher changes in annual CPI, is 
associated with worse access to external financing.  
 Concentration in banking sector(concentr) 
The expectations forthe concentration in banking sector were that it has a 
negative impact on access to finance. But the outlined regression produced negative 
sign for coefficient estimates of the respective variable, which denotes that higher 
concentration in banking sector favors access to finance. On of the possible 
explanations would be that larger banks have more resources that can be converted 
into credits, thus can afford to be less restrictive in client selection. 
 Share of state-owned banks in total banking assets(state) 
The estimates for variable for implication of state-owned banks are positive, 
suggesting that it is associated with worse access to finance. There might be several 
causes for the obtained result: state-owned banks might be more rigid in 
implementation of new financial instruments, that would foster access to finance; 
state-owned banks might be less efficient in resource allocation, being “directed” to 
some specific industry sectors; state-owned banks might be less eager to compete for 
  39 
the client. Thus, the tendency of diminishing share of state-owned banks in TCs 
should have a positive impact on the business environment. 
 Share of foreign-owned banks in total banking assets(foreign) 
One of the hypotheses tested during the present study was that higher 
implication of foreign-owned banks benefits access to finance. But the regressions 
output shows that the effect is of opposite sign. The reason behind such a relationship 
might be that foreign banks are more restrictive in selection of clients, and are 
focused only on high-return projects. This result is in line with several previous 
studies (Detragiache, Gupta, & Tressel(2006), Clarke, Cull, & Pería(2006) and 
others), which state that participation of foreign-owned banks leads to a better access 
to finance only to a narrow segment of companies, those that are more transparent 
and more profitable. Also, the cost of information gathering for foreign-owned banks 
might me higher, translating into higher risk premium demanded. 
 Financial depth(fdepth) 
The coefficient estimates for the respective variable are negative, which 
confirms that higher financial deepening increases access to finance. Thus the 
tendency of increasing financial depth in TCs allows building an optimistic forecast 
for evolution of access to finance. 
 Assessment of reforms in banking sector and reforms in securities 
markets and non-bank financial institutions(banksec) 
According to the second hypothesis of the present study, it was expected that 
reforms in banking sector and securities markets would lead to improvements in 
access to finance. The results prove the contrary: the coefficient estimates for a 
variables that combines liberalization indexes for bank sector and securities markets 
are positive, therefore a better progress towards full liberalization of specified 
segments is associated with worse access to finance. The probable explanation is that 
liberalization conditions imposed more severe conditions of client screening, which 
leads to a more reduced credit underwriting.  
 Corruption Perception Index(corrup) 
As anticipated by the third hypothesis of current thesis, corruption level does 
have a statistically significant impact on access to finance, and the results confirm the 
clear expectations that the higher the level of corruption - the worse the access to 
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financing. The negative signs of coefficient estimates denote that higher perception of 
corruption leads to increase in access to finance.  
 Crisis impact(crisis) 
Positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for crisis period 
dummy show that the access to finance was weaker in the year 2009, compared to 
2002 and 2005, the result that is not surprising. Also, controlling for crisis effect 
helped improve estimation of other determinants of access to finance.  
 Firm size (size) 
The outcome obtained for the size variable confirms previous studies, which 
conclude that large companies benefit from a better access to finance (Bougheas, 
Mizen, & Yalcin (2006), Hainz & Nabokin (2009), Volz (2008) and others). The 
coefficient estimates for size variable are negative and statistically significant. The 
reasoning behind the obtained outcome is that large firms are usually more 
transparent, have a longer credit history and can provide a larger collateral – these are 
just several factors that might determine banks to be willing more to allocate financial 
resources to larger companies than to medium and small ones. Also, larger firms tend 
to ask for larger amount of credits, which motivates banks to direction finances 
towards one large client, rather than spreading it between a number of small clients, 
which would require more resources to track. Table 4.4 depicts the distribution of 
average amount of credit demanded, by company size, extracted from BEEPS data. 
Table 4.4:Average amount of credit demanded versus firm size 





Source: author’s computations 
 Service sector(serv) 
The dummy for service sector (which includes firms that operate in wholesale, 
retail, IT, hotel and restaurants industry, or other services, as mentioned in Chapter 3) 
has negative sign of coefficient estimates and is statistically significant, which 
suggests that companies from service sector face less obstacles in obtaining credit 
financing – the results that confirms the third hypothesis of the present thesis. 
Possible explanation, also stated in the description of variable in methodology 
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section, is that firms operating in service sector have more liquid assets (more 
qualitative collateral -  in terms of bank credit), and higher than average profitability 
rates, which sould lower the demanded by banks risk premiums, thus increasing 
access to finance for the respective firms. 
 Audit(audit) 
One of the main hypotheses of the present study was that companies that 
apply for external audit services have a better access to finance, compared to firms 
that do not. The coefficient estimates for audit dummy variable is negative and 
statistically significant, which confirms the hypothesis statement. The audited 
financial statements imply more credibility for the company, which should translate 
in lower risk premiums and thus in lower interest rates asked by creditors. Thus, the 
costs associated with applying for external audit services can be more or less offset 
by smaller interest rates demanded by banks.   
 Legal status (sole and private) 
The two dummies created for the assessment of impact of firm‟s legal status 
on access to finance show that companies that sole proprietorship and privately held 
or limited liabilities companies have better access to finance: the estimates 
coefficients for privately held/limited liabilities companies are stably negative and 
significant, and the coefficient estimates for sole proprietorship are negative for 
second and third equations. The positive sign for sole variable for the first equation 
can lead to conclusions that it is less likely that a sole proprietorship firm would 
report “No obstacle” at all in response to question on obstacles faced in accessing the 
external financing.  
 
Based on the results mentioned above, the following chapter outlines the main 
conclusions about the effects of determinants of access to finance and how these 
effects can be interpreted in policy making.   










While in existing literature there is no unique opinion on effect of different 
factors on the access to finance for individual firms, one of the main purposes of the 
current thesis was to approach the mentioned issue from the angles of both external 
and internal factors, that determine a better or a worse access to financing. Thus, a 
combination of firm-level data and country-level data is used in assessing the impact 
of different determinants on access to finance. The analysis is based on the BEEPS 
survey, conducted by World Bank in 29 countries, in year 2002, 2005 and 2009, 
which contains information on enterprises report on the obstacles faced in obtaining 
external financing, as well as other different firm-level data.  The mentioned database 
was combined with indicators such as macroeconomic environment volatility, 
concentration in banking sector, foreign-owned and state-owned banks implication, 
depth of financial systems and others.  
The regression model was constructed based on anterior studies on the 
question of access to finance and the assumptions about the impact of some 
previously not analyzed determinants. In addition to indicators analyzed in anterior 
studies, two country-level variables were introduced into regression model: a variable 
for corruption effects and a variable that combined the influence of liberalization of 
banking sector and securities market segment (created using principal component 
analysis). For firm-level indicators, dummy variables for service sector, for 
ownership status and for audited financial statements were included. Also, the control 
variable that account for crisis effect was incorporated in the model. 
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Although previous studies in the field of access to finance apply Ordered 
Logit or Ordered Probit on the data, the estimations of the current thesis were 
effectuated using Generalized Ordered Logit model. The main reasons for choosing 
the Generalized Ordered Logit over other models is that it is less restrictive that 
Ordered Logit (which also often violates the parallel lines assumption – base 
assumption for the models that specialize on the analysis of ordinal dependent 
variables), but more parsimonious that Multinominal Logistic models. The applied 
econometric model allows analysis of variables impact across the categories of 
dependent variable. The outcomes obtained by outlined methodology proved to be 
robust and consistent. 
The empirical results suggest that the access to finance in TCs can be 
improved with an appropriate approach in policy making. The regression output leads 
to conclusion that a more volatile macroeconomic environment is associated with 
worse access to finance, thus stabilization of inflation would have a positive effect on 
firms‟ access to external financing. Since concentration in banking sector proved to 
foster access to finance, there should not be any specific measures against the 
increase in the respective ratio in banking system. Contrary, as implication of state-
owned banks and foreign owned banks seems to have a negative effect on access to 
finance, the increase of these implications should not be encouraged artificially in 
TCs. Any drastic restrictions in implication of foreign-owned or state-owned banks 
may have adverse effects for the business environment, as mostly any rough 
implications in free markets mechanism, nevertheless refraining from stimulation of 
state-owned or foreign banks involvement may have a beneficial impact on access to 
finance. 
The outcomes for the depth of financial markets clearly suggest that deeper 
financial systems provide better access to finance. Thus, banks might be stimulated to 
increase the amount of financial resources allocated to private credit. Such measures 
might include state guarantees for private credits, decrease in interest rates on long-
term credits set by Central Banks, and reduction in capital requirements to adequate 
values (for example, minimum required reserves for year 2013 for Moldova are 14%, 
and for Romania are 15% for local currency and 20% for foreign currencies
6
). But it 
is imperative for these actions to be taken prudentially, and with regards to specifics 
and conjuncture of local financial markets and economic environment, since the 
stability of financial markets is of priority.  
                                                 
6
Sorce: official websites of Central Banks of Moldova and Romania, www.bnm.md & www.bnro.ro 
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Another way to increase financial depth would be contribution to 
development of stock markets. In the present, financial depth in TCs is only 
associated with banking sector, and the potential of stock markets is mostly 
unexplored in the mentioned countries. Reformation of stock market infrastructure 
and mechanisms would allows companies to have an alternative to bank credit 
financing. The regression result for banking liberalization and securities markets 
liberalization index show that the reforms in these segments are associated with 
worse access to finance. It can be assumed regarding the impact in bank liberalization 
that the reforms in banking regulation led to more strict requirements in credit 
emission, which had a negative impact on access to finance. But the outcomes for the 
securities market index might indicate that the reforms of this segment are not 
accomplished efficiently in TCs and that there is space for potential improvements in 
order to assure a better access to finance. 
The results of assessment of corruption impact on the access to finance are 
quite expectable. High level of corruption in one of the major problems in TCs, and it 
affects almost all fields of national economy. According to 2009 data for Corruption 
Perception Index, 11 out of 15 former soviet republics have the worst corruption 
perception level among transition economies (more detailed information is contained 
in Appendix A). Corruption spread during the transition phase, when the state control 
had been removed, but an efficient substitute for it had not yet been created. Later, 
corruption extend was catalyzed by very low income per capita in TCs. Corruption 
may affect the access to finance trough several channels: lobbying for financial 
resources to be directed towards a particular client; lobbying for supporting a 
particular bank with state subsidizing; demands of bribery of middle level officials or 
employees for proceeding the documents; and others. Thus, decreasing the level 
corruption is one of the targets in order to provide a better access to finance. 
As the firm size analysis show that larger firms tend to face fewer obstacles in 
obtaining external financing, access to finance for small and medium companies can 
be improved by technical assistance of these categories of firms in applying for or 
attracting financing.  Many TCs have specially design programs for supporting SME, 
but their efficiency is still subject of discussion, as they were launched relatively 
recently, and it is too early for the results to be assessed. The coefficient estimates for 
dummy for service sector of economy show that firms operating in service sector gain 
better access to finance, thus there is no need to undertake special measures to assist 
this category of companies.  
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The result for audit variable implies that more transparent companies benefit 
from better access to finance, which reflects that the information asymmetry comes 
with a certain price in accessing the finance. While many SME cannot afford the cost 
of external audit, creation of unique database on SME applying for credits would 
make possible tracking of credit history for such companies, and would make 
decisions making about loan emission faster, more efficient and less risky, which 
would stimulate banks to direct financial resources towards smaller firms. 
The results for analysis of impact of legal status on access to finance reflect 
that sole proprietorship firms and privately held or limited liabilities companies face 
fewer obstacles in accessing external financing.  
A more general conclusion to the present study would be that policy making 
in the field of financial markets should be orientated towards stimulating banks not to 
discriminate between large enterprises and small and medium firms. Another issue 
that should be taken in consideration is the reorientation of stock markets scopes in 
TCs. In present, stock markets in these countries have merely the role of mechanism 
for transfer of ownership rights, while the role of attracting financial resources is 
almost obsolete, both in terms of equity and obligations issue. In most of TCs the 
amount of available financial instrument is very limited, and the legislation regarding 
existing instruments is confusing and incomplete. Mostly, the institutions that form 
the infrastructure of capital market are not politically independent, that might create 
obstacles for private capital holders or firms seeking private investments. The rigidity 
of state institution that are controlling stock markets in TCs, as well as high level of 
corruption in such structures, often force companies to pay higher interest rates for 
financing on banking sector, rather than dealing with state officials, which is also a 
part of inheritance obtained from planned economy regime. 
Therefore, the situation in transition economies determined that for small and 
medium sized enterprises especially, but in most cases for large companies also, the 
decision of financing is reduced to choice among banks, and does not include capital 
market as an option.  
A collaboration with business representatives in order to gain more 
information on the specific obstacles faced by the enterprise in the accessing the 
external financing might extend the understanding of problems related access to 
finances. In transition countries these may include feedback on the reasons of loans 
denial, on corruption tentatives, on the efficiency of collaboration with brokers or 
underwriting companies, or other capital markets participants, including regulatory 
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institutions, or other specific information – the data that is not availableat the 
moment, but might be useful in targeting better access to finance for firms. 
The findings of the present thesis are important for understanding the nature 
of access to finance, which is highly dependable on the country specific and time 
specific framework.  Further research on the on topic of access to finance can be 
extended by the inclusion of more firm-level or country-level indicators, by 
increasing the countries sample (but controlling for indicators as GDP per capita, 
changes in CPI, and other macroeconomic data), or by analyzing a more recent time 
period, since the situation of financial markets in transition economies is sensitive to 
changes and relatively dynamic. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix A. Country-level indicators 


















Albania 5.51 85.84 51.4 45.89 5.91 2.5 2.3 1.7 
Armenia 1.06 100.00 0.0 54.15 6.57  2.3 2 
Azerbaijan 2.77 64.03 62.0 4.07 5.07 2 2.3 1.7 
Belarus 42.54 85.04 61.9 8.08 7.25 4.8 1.7 2 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
 67.65 6.2 76.68   2.3 1.7 
Bulgaria 5.81 77.83 14.1 75.15 16.31 4 3.3 2.3 
Croatia 1.67 69.36 4.0 90.16 38.54 3.8 3.7 2.7 
Czech 
Republic 
1.79 83.55 4.6 85.83 33.51 3.7 3.7 3 
Estonia 3.57 100.00 0.0 97.54 40.22 5.6 3.7 3.3 
Georgia 5.59 99.15 0.0 12.23 7.40 2.4 2.3 1.7 
Hungary 5.26 78.66 10.7 85.01 32.56 4.9 4 3.7 
Kazakhstan 5.84 77.58 5.2 34.3 17.11 2.3 2.7 2 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2.13 62.40 9.7 50.45 3.92  2 2 
Latvia 1.92 68.50 4.0 42.8 28.45 3.7 3.7 3 
Lithuania 0.28 91.58 0.0 96.07 14.28 4.8 3 3 
Macedonia 2.31 87.74 2.0 44.01 17.38  2.7 1.7 
Moldova 5.30 100.00 13.4 36.67 14.67 2.1 2.3 2 
Mongolia 0.92    11.83    
Montenegro  79.77 23.8 16.86   2 1.7 
Poland 1.90 89.58 26.6 70.74 27.02 4 3.3 3.7 
Romania 22.54 75.23 43.6 52.92 8.34 2.6 2.7 2 
Russia 1.99 44.24  8.07 9.85 2.7 2 2.3 
Serbia 19.49 71.16 35.6 26.99 22.18  2.3 1.7 
Slovak 
Republic 
3.32 94.96 1.9 84.14 36.92 3.7 3.3 2.3 
Slovenia 7.47 91.66 13.3 16.87 36.75 6 3.3 2.7 
Tajikistan 12.25 88.59 4.5 1.78 12.03  1.7 1 
Turkey 44.96 99.75   12.54 3.2   
Turkmenista
n 
 95.67 95.7 1.67   1 1 
Ukraine 0.76 51.39 12.0 12.3 14.54 2.4 2.3 2 
Uzbekistan  98.62 73.7 3.19  2.9 1.7 2 
 
Source: WDI & EBRD Country Database. 
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Albania 2.4 78.2 7.7 92.3 15.3 2.4 16 2.7 1.7 
Armenia 0.6 82.7 0.0 48.7 8.0 2.9 21 2.7 2.0 
Azerbaijan 9.7 53.5 55.2 6.6 9.5 2.2 44 2.3 1.7 
Belarus 10.3 100.0 75.2 16.2 15.9 2.6 30 1.7 2 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
 71.3 3.6 90.9 36.5 2.9 33 2.7 1.7 
Bulgaria 5.0 68.4 1.7 74.5 41.0 4.0 34 3.7 2.3 
Croatia 3.3 77.9 3.4 91.3 56.4 3.4 34 4.0 2.7 
Czech 
Republic 
1.8 80.2   37.6 4.3    
Estonia 4.1 100.0 0.0 99.4 56.6 6.4 13 4.0 3.0 
Georgia 8.2 99.7 0.0 75.9 14.8 2.3 19 2.7 1.7 
Hungary 3.6 84.5 7.0 82.6 49.9 5.0 38 4.0 4.0 
Kazakhstan 7.6 77.0 0.2 7.3 35.7 2.6 34 3.0 2.3 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
4.4 100.0 4.8 73.6 8.0 2.3 19 2.3 2.0 
Latvia 6.7 72.5 4.3 57.9 67.8 4.2 23 3.7 3.0 
Lithuania 2.7 91.9 0.0 91.7 40.9 4.8 12 3.7 3.0 
Macedonia 0.2 87.5 1.6 51.3 25.1 2.7 20 2.7 2.0 
Moldova 12.0 70.3 19.3 19.6 0.0 2.9 16 2.7 2.0 
Mongolia 12.7 92.8 3.8 39.1 17.6 3.0 16 2.3 2.0 
Montenegro  90.0 5.1 87.7 20.7 2.8 10 2.3 1.7 
Poland 2.1 70.0 21.5 74.3 33.4 3.4 61 3.7 3.7 
Romania 9.0 78.1 6.5 59.2 19.9 3.0 33 3.0 2.3 
Russia 9.0 33.8  8.3 25.7 2.4 1253 2.3 2.7 
Serbia 16.1 61.0 23.9 66.0 30.7 2.8 40 2.7 2.0 
Slovak 
Republic 
2.7 82.6 1.1 97.3 35.1 4.3 23 3.7 2.7 
Slovenia 2.5 74.2 12.0 22.6 56.3 6.1 25 3.3 2.7 
Tajikistan 7.1 79.4 9.7 8.9 23.3 2.1 13 2.0 1.0 
Turkey 10.1  33.1 6.3 22.2 3.5 51   
Turkmenistan   96.3 1.0 1.4 1.8 11 1.0 1.0 
Ukraine 13.5 41.2 9.4 21.3 32.2 2.6 165 2.7 1.7 
Uzbekistan  86.0 67.7 4.4 21.8 2.2 29 1.7 2.0 
 
Source: WDI & EBRD Country Database. 
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Albania 2.3 83.8 0.0 92.4 37.2  3.0 1.7 
Armenia 3.4 62.2 0.0 63.6 23.6 2.7 2.7 2.3 
Azerbaijan 1.4 55.9 43.4 9.3 16.5 2.3 2.3 1.7 
Belarus 12.9 89.8 77.9 20.6 37.1 2.4 2.3 2 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
-0.4 72.0 0.8 94.5 50.2 3.0 3.0 1.7 
Bulgaria 2.8 78.0 2.4 84.0 75.3 3.8 3.7 3.0 
Croatia 2.4 75.8 4.1 91.0 69.6 4.1 4.0 3.0 
Czech 
Republic 
1.0 76.6    4.9   
EBRD         
Estonia -0.1  0.0 98.3 91.7 6.6 4.0 3.7 
Georgia 1.7 99.9 0.0 89.1 30.2 4.1 2.7 1.7 
Hungary 4.2 92.4 3.9 81.3 66.5 5.1 4.0 4.0 
Kazakhstan 7.3 74.0 0.6 17.2 53.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
6.9  9.9 72.0 12.1 1.9 2.3 2.0 
Latvia 3.5 70.3 17.1 69.3 103.3 4.5 3.7 3.0 
Lithuania 4.5 86.8 0.0 91.5 69.8 4.9 3.7 3.3 
Macedonia -0.7 85.2 1.4 93.3 42.9 3.8 3.0 2.7 
Moldova -0.1 67.2 12.8 41.0 0.0 3.3 3.0 2.0 
Mongolia 6.3  3.2 41.9 28.3 2.7 2.7 2.3 
Montenegro 3.5 92.6 0.0 87.1 80.4 3.9 3.0 1.7 
Poland 3.8 60.3 22.1 72.3 55.2 5.0 3.7 3.7 
Romania 5.6 84.0 7.9 84.3 40.7 3.8 3.3 3.0 
Russia 10.4 37.7 39.2 18.3 44.4 2.2 3.0 3.0 
Serbia 8.1 52.4 16.0 75.3 45.0 3.5 3.0 2.0 
Slovak 
Republic 
1.6 89.7 0.9 91.6 51.1 4.5 3.7 3.0 
Slovenia 0.9 67.9 16.7 29.5 92.7 6.6 3.3 3.0 
Tajikistan 6.4    22.5 2.0 2.3 1.0 
Turkey 6.3 71.0 32.2 15.8 33.6 4.4 3.0 2.7 
Turkmenistan   96.3 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.0 1.0 
Ukraine 15.9 40.0 17.0 50.8 73.3 2.2 3.0 2.0 
Uzbekistan  94.1   14.6 1.7 1.0 2.0 
 
Source: WDI & EBRD Country Database. 
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Table B.1:Robustness check of the model 
  Base eq 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 cpidelta 0.006  0.010 0.016 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 
  (2.04)*  (3.11)** (5.81)** (2.15)* (0.76) (0.55) (2.09)* (1.88) (2.26)* (2.35)* (1.52) 
 concentr -0.005 -0.007  -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (4.96)** (7.04)**  (3.06)** (2.38)* (3.63)** (6.88)** (8.38)** (4.95)** (5.20)** (5.04)** (5.07)** 
 state 0.008 0.007 0.008  0.007 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 
  (7.20)** (7.93)** (7.11)**  (6.24)** (9.17)** (8.02)** (6.38)** (7.18)** (7.26)** (6.77)** (7.80)** 
 foreign 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002  0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (4.34)** (5.35)** (2.74)** (2.54)*  (4.81)** (7.07)** (3.59)** (4.59)** (3.97)** (3.79)** (4.21)** 
 fdepth -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008  -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
  (7.48)** (7.80)** (7.26)** (10.05)** (7.82)**  (5.82)** (9.44)** (7.45)** (7.52)** (7.92)** (7.42)** 
 banksec 0.112 0.087 0.149 0.139 0.143 0.062  0.035 0.112 0.126 0.119 0.113 
  (5.83)** (4.92)** (8.10)** (7.42)** (7.48)** (3.43)**  (2.13)* (5.85)** (6.58)** (6.19)** (5.94)** 
 corrup -0.140 -0.119 -0.200 -0.146 -0.141 -0.175 -0.088  -0.135 -0.152 -0.145 -0.142 
  (7.43)** (6.39)** (12.13)** (7.90)** (7.54)** (9.64)** (5.34)**  (7.19)** (8.09)** (7.69)** (7.52)** 
 size -0.146 -0.129 -0.140 -0.133 -0.150 -0.145 -0.145 -0.139  -0.101 -0.181 -0.163 
  (6.58)** (5.91)** (6.42)** (6.19)** (6.79)** (6.56)** (6.56)** (6.42)**  (4.66)** (8.43)** (8.70)** 
 serv -0.301 -0.306 -0.302 -0.311 -0.299 -0.302 -0.313 -0.313 -0.254  -0.298 -0.265 
  (9.19)** (9.55)** (9.35)** (9.78)** (9.16)** (9.23)** (9.59)** (9.81)** (7.98)**  (9.11)** (9.45)** 
 audit -0.177 -0.177 -0.188 -0.169 -0.157 -0.193 -0.187 -0.200 -0.250 -0.173  -0.175 
  (6.07)** (6.17)** (6.51)** (5.97)** (5.39)** (6.61)** (6.41)** (7.00)** (8.96)** (5.93)**  (6.04)** 
 sole 0.088 0.081 0.102 0.113 0.101 0.064 0.065 0.079 0.157 0.088 0.115  
  (2.07)* (1.96)* (2.41)* (2.77)** (2.36)* (1.52) (1.52) (1.93) (3.81)** (2.07)* (2.72)**  
 private -0.137 -0.118 -0.139 -0.155 -0.137 -0.139 -0.147 -0.153 -0.117 -0.135 -0.125  
  (4.13)** (3.62)** (4.27)** (4.81)** (4.13)** (4.21)** (4.44)** (4.72)** (3.56)** (4.09)** (3.79)**  
 crisis 0.301 0.269 0.322 0.423 0.356 0.134 0.235 0.317 0.271 0.296 0.329 0.242 
  (6.99)** (6.55)** (7.75)** (10.26)** (8.43)** (3.64)** (5.65)** (7.40)** (6.32)** (6.88)** (7.68)** (5.85)** 
 _cons 1.808 1.858 1.627 1.783 1.764 1.617 1.683 1.638 1.523 1.655 1.821 1.827 
  (17.94)** (19.24)** (18.87)** (20.05)** (18.09)** (16.62)** (17.12)** (16.86)** (16.81)** (16.74)** (18.09)** (19.38)** 
1 cpidelta 0.013  0.016 0.020 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.012 
  (4.48)**  (5.63)** (7.85)** (4.50)** (3.09)** (2.90)** (4.50)** (4.24)** (4.65)** (4.83)** (4.16)** 
 concentr -0.005 -0.007  -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (4.96)** (7.04)**  (3.06)** (2.38)* (3.63)** (6.88)** (8.38)** (4.95)** (5.20)** (5.04)** (5.07)** 
 state 0.006 0.007 0.006  0.003 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
  (5.76)** (7.74)** (5.61)**  (3.34)** (7.80)** (6.75)** (5.22)** (5.78)** (5.83)** (5.32)** (6.09)** 
 foreign 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004  0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
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  (7.88)** (8.36)** (6.54)** (6.31)**  (8.29)** (10.95)** (7.30)** (8.10)** (7.65)** (7.36)** (7.97)** 
 fdepth -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008  -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
  (7.48)** (7.80)** (7.26)** (10.05)** (7.82)**  (5.82)** (9.44)** (7.45)** (7.52)** (7.92)** (7.42)** 
 banksec 0.112 0.087 0.149 0.139 0.181 0.062  0.035 0.112 0.126 0.119 0.113 
  (5.83)** (4.92)** (8.10)** (7.42)** (9.76)** (3.43)**  (2.13)* (5.85)** (6.58)** (6.19)** (5.94)** 
 corrup -0.140 -0.119 -0.200 -0.146 -0.141 -0.175 -0.088  -0.135 -0.152 -0.145 -0.142 
  (7.43)** (6.39)** (12.13)** (7.90)** (7.54)** (9.64)** (5.34)**  (7.19)** (8.09)** (7.69)** (7.52)** 
 size -0.147 -0.138 -0.141 -0.140 -0.152 -0.146 -0.147 -0.139  -0.112 -0.182 -0.163 
  (6.81)** (6.52)** (6.59)** (6.66)** (7.08)** (6.77)** (6.79)** (6.63)**  (5.34)** (8.73)** (8.70)** 
 serv -0.232 -0.231 -0.230 -0.239 -0.224 -0.232 -0.244 -0.238 -0.185  -0.229 -0.265 
  (7.38)** (7.50)** (7.41)** (7.83)** (7.15)** (7.39)** (7.79)** (7.79)** (6.04)**  (7.30)** (9.45)** 
 audit -0.177 -0.177 -0.188 -0.169 -0.157 -0.193 -0.187 -0.200 -0.250 -0.173  -0.175 
  (6.07)** (6.17)** (6.51)** (5.97)** (5.39)** (6.61)** (6.41)** (7.00)** (8.96)** (5.93)**  (6.04)** 
 sole -0.035 -0.053 -0.020 0.001 -0.017 -0.057 -0.058 -0.032 0.034 -0.034 -0.008  
  (0.85) (1.35) (0.50) (0.02) (0.42) (1.41) (1.44) (0.83) (0.86) (0.84) (0.20)  
 private -0.137 -0.118 -0.139 -0.155 -0.137 -0.139 -0.147 -0.153 -0.117 -0.135 -0.125  
  (4.13)** (3.62)** (4.27)** (4.81)** (4.13)** (4.21)** (4.44)** (4.72)** (3.56)** (4.09)** (3.79)**  
 crisis 0.339 0.305 0.364 0.452 0.403 0.171 0.270 0.344 0.307 0.332 0.366 0.297 
  (8.06)** (7.63)** (9.02)** (11.26)** (9.81)** (4.81)** (6.70)** (8.26)** (7.36)** (7.90)** (8.75)** (7.39)** 
 _cons 0.822 0.933 0.638 0.804 0.922 0.637 0.700 0.646 0.540 0.719 0.837 0.827 
  (8.36)** (9.86)** (7.63)** (9.29)** (9.63)** (6.70)** (7.30)** (6.81)** (6.08)** (7.42)** (8.52)** (8.94)** 
2 cpidelta 0.013  0.016 0.024 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.013 
  (3.96)**  (4.90)** (8.01)** (3.89)** (2.70)** (2.46)* (3.58)** (3.65)** (4.09)** (4.29)** (3.82)** 
 concentr -0.005 -0.007  -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (4.96)** (7.04)**  (3.06)** (2.38)* (3.63)** (6.88)** (8.38)** (4.95)** (5.20)** (5.04)** (5.07)** 
 state 0.010 0.011 0.009  0.005 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 
  (7.70)** (9.84)** (7.52)**  (4.76)** (9.33)** (8.69)** (7.60)** (7.64)** (7.77)** (7.35)** (7.74)** 
 foreign 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006  0.008 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (9.32)** (9.58)** (8.13)** (7.53)**  (9.59)** (11.81)** (9.06)** (9.53)** (9.19)** (8.92)** (9.48)** 
 fdepth -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008  -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
  (7.48)** (7.80)** (7.26)** (10.05)** (7.82)**  (5.82)** (9.44)** (7.45)** (7.52)** (7.92)** (7.42)** 
 banksec 0.112 0.087 0.149 0.139 0.208 0.062  0.035 0.112 0.126 0.119 0.113 
  (5.83)** (4.92)** (8.10)** (7.42)** (10.10)** (3.43)**  (2.13)* (5.85)** (6.58)** (6.19)** (5.94)** 
 corrup -0.140 -0.119 -0.200 -0.146 -0.141 -0.175 -0.088  -0.135 -0.152 -0.145 -0.142 
  (7.43)** (6.39)** (12.13)** (7.90)** (7.54)** (9.64)** (5.34)**  (7.19)** (8.09)** (7.69)** (7.52)** 
 size -0.212 -0.204 -0.203 -0.208 -0.216 -0.211 -0.212 -0.205  -0.173 -0.247 -0.163 
  (7.98)** (7.83)** (7.73)** (8.02)** (8.15)** (7.95)** (7.99)** (7.91)**  (6.69)** (9.51)** (8.70)** 
 serv -0.258 -0.266 -0.258 -0.272 -0.249 -0.258 -0.272 -0.267 -0.192  -0.256 -0.265 
  (6.69)** (7.01)** (6.73)** (7.23)** (6.44)** (6.69)** (7.06)** (7.09)** (5.10)**  (6.63)** (9.45)** 
  57 
 audit -0.177 -0.177 -0.188 -0.169 -0.157 -0.193 -0.187 -0.200 -0.250 -0.173  -0.175 
  (6.07)** (6.17)** (6.51)** (5.97)** (5.39)** (6.61)** (6.41)** (7.00)** (8.96)** (5.93)**  (6.04)** 
 sole -0.152 -0.162 -0.141 -0.081 -0.131 -0.175 -0.176 -0.168 -0.053 -0.151 -0.125  
  (3.18)** (3.47)** (2.94)** (1.77) (2.73)** (3.65)** (3.70)** (3.62)** (1.14) (3.15)** (2.63)**  
 private -0.137 -0.118 -0.139 -0.155 -0.137 -0.139 -0.147 -0.153 -0.117 -0.135 -0.125  
  (4.13)** (3.62)** (4.27)** (4.81)** (4.13)** (4.21)** (4.44)** (4.72)** (3.56)** (4.09)** (3.79)**  
 crisis 0.142 0.117 0.157 0.270 0.215 -0.025 0.071 0.152 0.099 0.134 0.168 0.107 
  (2.97)** (2.56)* (3.41)** (5.87)** (4.56)** (0.59) (1.55) (3.20)** (2.09)* (2.80)** (3.52)** (2.35)* 
 _cons -0.338 -0.222 -0.514 -0.280 -0.090 -0.514 -0.457 -0.514 -0.738 -0.458 -0.324 -0.491 
  (3.11)** (2.12)* (5.34)** (2.93)** (0.88) (4.85)** (4.29)** (4.89)** (7.65)** (4.30)** (2.98)** (4.96)** 
N 18,293 19,020 18,763 19,318 18,293 18,293 18,293 19,208 18,310 18,293 18,293 18,293 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Source: author’s computations 
 
 
 
 
 
